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Appeal court judges do not just vote and run; they vote and then they explain, at length, why 
theirs is the most reasonable position. Since the core of explanation is persuasion, this means 
that between the initial conference vote and the fi nal decision, some of the judges sometimes 
change their minds; and this in turn means that sometimes an initial majority becomes a 
minority and vice versa, something which often leaves clear footprints in the written record. 
This paper demonstrates that this happens more often than we might think—some 255 times 
for the last three Chief Justiceships, or roughly once in every four divided panels. It identifi es 
which judges tend to gain, and which tend to lose, from “swing” judgments, specifi cally fi nding 
that the phenomenon has consistently favoured male judges over their female colleagues. The 
paper closes with arguments as to why swings matter.
 
Les juges des les cours d’appel ne se contentent pas de voter; ils votent et se livrent ensuite 
à de longues explications des raisons pour lesquelles leur avis est le plus logique. Du fait que 
le cœur de leur argumentation réside dans la persuasion, il découle qu’entre le vote initial de 
conférence et la décision fi nale, certains des juges changent parfois d’avis; cela signifi e donc 
qu’il arrive parfois que la majorité initiale devienne minorité et vice versa, ce qui laisse souvent 
des traces sans équivoque dans les écrits. Cet article démontre que ce phénomène se produit 
plus souvent qu’on ne l’imagine, soit 255 fois sous les trois derniers juges en chef, ou environ 
une fois sur quatre lorsque la décision n’est pas unanime. Cela permet d’identifi er quels sont 
les juges qui gagnent, et quels sont ceux qui perdent, lors de revirements de verdicts, et plus 
particulièrement de constater que ce phénomène favorise constamment les juges masculins 
au détriment de leurs collègues féminines. L’article se conclut par des arguments soulignant 
l’importance des revirements de verdicts.
* Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Lethbridge.
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SOMETIMES, SUPREME COURT JUDGES change their minds. More specifi cally, 
sometimes they indicate at the post-hearing conference that they are of one 
inclination with respect to the outcome and reasons in the immediate case, but 
when the decision is fi nally handed down they instead sign the reasons of a 
colleague who was drafting what started as minority reasons, or vice versa.  Th ere 
is of course nothing improper, let alone sinister, about this; collegial persuasion is 
what panel appellate court decision making is all about. Appeal court judges do 
not vote and run—they vote and explain, at length, in a way that constrains their 
own future decisions and provides guidance to lower courts and potential litigants. 
In the process of framing this explanation they circulate their draft judgments 
and invite critical comments from their colleagues on the bench. Th e focus of 
the ongoing substantive exchanges within the court is presumably non-writers 
suggesting revisions or refi nements to the reasons that are being drafted as the 
judgment of the court; but these exchanges can also be directed to changing 
minds, to moving votes and signatures, and even to altering outcomes. Sometimes, 
those attempts succeed.
The regular procedure of the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) is well 
understood.1 Cases are received for hearing as appeals by right, appeals by leave 
of the Court itself, as reference questions from the government of Canada or 
one of the Houses of Parliament, or, exceptionally and unusually, by leave of 
1. See e.g. Ian Greene et al, Final Appeal: Decision-making in Canadian Courts of Appeal 
(Toronto: James Lorimer & Co, 1998) at ch 6; Donald R Songer, Th e Transformation of the 
Supreme Court of Canada: An Empirical Examination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2008) at ch 5.
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the court of appeal from which appeal is sought. 2 Th ey are scheduled for oral 
argument and (except for a minority of cases that are decided from the bench on 
the same day) reserved for judgment, which typically means a delay of several 
months. After oral argument, the judges on the panel meet in conference for a 
short discussion that reveals whether the judges are inclined to allow or dismiss, 
and on what grounds; both of these elements may generate unanimity or may 
indicate one or more judges on the Court who are inclined diff erently. At that 
time, responsibility for writing the judgment of the Court is assigned,3 and over 
the following weeks and months, the assigned judge will circulate draft reasons 
among the other members of the panel and will receive suggestions as to how 
those reasons may be strengthened or improved. Th e judge or judges who found 
themselves in the minority at conference will also write reasons (separately, or 
jointly with a lead author and parallel internal circulation and modifi cation process), 
which are circulated as well, but not until after the draft majority judgment has 
been circulated. Ultimately, the Court decides that it is ready to present the 
decision and schedules the public presentation of the outcome as well as supporting 
reasons, with the minority or minorities enjoying the right to publish their own 
dissenting or separately concurring reasons. In very general terms, about half of 
the decisions of the Court have been unanimous over recent decades, with the 
remainder including minority reasons that are sometimes very extensive.
If one were dealing with the United States Supreme Court (USSC), parts of 
this discussion would be much more focused and refi ned. Some USSC justices 
keep voluminous notes and records such that, after a not-inconsiderable time, 
academics are sometimes able to track the votes and positions of individual judges 
through the deliberation process and link any shifts to written exchanges between 
judges regarding the specifi c wording, exchanges that may involve simple per-
suasion, or, sometimes, explicit negotiation.4 (Although I note that not all judges 
keep such detailed records or make them available, not all academics necessarily 
have unfettered access to them, and—to repeat—there is often a considerable 
delay.) Canadian academics enjoy no comparable resources,5 and the Court takes 
2. For a recent example, see HL v Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 25, [2005] 1 SCR 401.
3. Formally, the writing of the judgment is assigned by the Chief Justice; in practice, it is usually 
the case that a judge volunteers to write the reasons, it often being obvious who best refl ects 
the majority or unanimous position, failing which the Chief Justice will suggest who might 
volunteer, failing which the Chief Justice asks someone to write. See Songer, supra note 1 at 
128; Greene, supra note 1 at 117.
4. See e.g. Forrest Maltzman, James F Spriggs II & Paul J Wahlbeck, Crafting Law on the 
Supreme Court: Th e Collegial Game (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
5. More correctly: Some Canadian scholars do occasionally have access to some comparable 
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the principle of the confi dentiality of its deliberations very seriously.6 For an 
American, then, what follows is an analysis of only the tip of the iceberg, the 
reason being that the rest of the iceberg is simply not available for examination.7 
But my argument is that the tip of the iceberg is considerably larger—its content 
and consequences considerably more important—than one might assume, and 
that we are missing important clues about the behaviour of the court and the 
evolution of its jurisprudence unless we take it fully into account. Th e previous 
paragraphs of this article closed with the statement, “Sometimes, those attempts 
[to swing other judges’ votes] succeed”; it would be more accurate, and a better 
justifi cation of this enquiry, to say: “Surprisingly often, those attempts succeed.” 
Losing the majority is something less than a routine but something more than an 
exceptional part of the way the Court meets its obligations.8 Emmett Macfarlane, 
after noting some examples of this vote fl uidity, reports that in his interviews the 
justices of the Court insisted that such vote switching is unusual.  However, he 
does conclude that this may be intentional understatement to avoid reinforcing 
the notion that the law is essentially indeterminate.9 Th is article lends support to 
this suspicion.
resources for limited periods and purposes—for example, Robert J Sharpe and Kent Roach 
had access to court conference notes for their biography of Chief Justice Dickson—but the 
point remains that such material is not generally or widely accessible in Canada to the extent 
that it is in the United States. See Robert J Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s 
Journey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003).
6. At one time, I approached Chief Justice McLachlin to enquire if it was possible to fi nd 
out which of the justices had been assigned at conference the responsibility for writing the 
judgment of the Court for a list of some dozen cases; the response was a polite but fi rm and 
categorical refusal that cited the principle of the confi dentiality of its deliberations. For a 
description of another episode demonstrating how seriously the Court takes this principle 
in the face of academic enquiry, see Tim Naumetz, “Gag on SCC law clerks has ‘chilling 
eff ect’” Law Times (28 June 2009), online: <http://www.lawtimesnews.com/200906294937/
Headline-News/Gag-on-SCC-law-clerks-has-chilling-eff ect>.
7. Such that even when I identify a “swing” judgment, I cannot identify which of the judges 
supporting the new judgment of the Court did the swinging; nor can I identify shifting 
support between the various alternatives that may just have made the bloc supporting the 
judgment of the Court larger or smaller. As my metaphor suggests, I assume that most shifts 
between majority and minority take this less dramatic form.
8. Th is is not to deny that there is some degree of vote-switching that does not reveal itself 
in my approach; for example, Sharpe and Roach indicate that Dickson’s judgment for a 
unanimous Court Ogg-Moss began as a set of dissenting reasons. See R v Ogg-Moss, [1984] 2 
SCR 173, 14 CCC (3d) 116 [Ogg-Moss]; Sharpe & Roach, supra note 5 at 405.
9. Emmett Macfarlane, Th e Supreme Court of Canada and Th e Judicial Role: An Historical 
Institutionalist Account (DCL Th esis, Queen’s University Department of Politics, 2009) 
at 174, online: <http://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/1974/5313/1/Macfarlane_
Emmett_200911_PhD.pdf> [Macfarlane].
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I will suggest that relatively recent developments in the way that the Court 
presents its reasons (judgments and minority reasons alike) have made it 
possible to identify with reasonable confi dence those cases in which the writing 
of a judgment of the Court has swung from the judge initially assigned to one 
who was originally writing minority reasons. Th is in turn makes it possible to 
identify which judges have tended to gain (and tended to lose) infl uence as a 
result and to discuss some legal and constitutional “might-have-beens” suggested 
by those “in-the-end-not-judgments.” Unfortunately, I shall have to conclude 
by suggesting that the Court’s more recent trends in decision delivery seem to 
be closing the window on the distinctions and identifi cations that direct this 
discussion. Although the timing of this enquiry was triggered by the thought 
that the retirement of Justices Binnie and Charron logically marks the end of the 
“McLachlin II” court (just as the double replacement of Justices Iacobucci and 
Arbour with Justices Abella and Charron in August 2004 arguably marked the 
end of the “McLachlin I” court), this shift in decision-delivery styles provides 
an even stronger justifi cation. My research therefore covers the 26-year period 
defi ned on the one side by the appointment of Chief Justice Dickson in 1984 
and the retirement of Justices Binnie and Charron at the end of June 2011 on 
the other.
Th e signifi cance of these fi ndings is that they present the Court as not just a 
“deciding court” (which, of course, it is by defi nition) but also as a “persuading 
court,” with some of this persuasive force deployed within the Court itself in 
both deciding an outcome and providing clear, and often extensive, reasons for 
that outcome to serve as a guide to the lower courts. Th e most dramatic aspect of 
any SCC decision is often the fact that it declares a winner and a loser, and this 
usually dominates the headlines; but my position is that over the long run the 
most important aspect of the decision is the formal reasons that support, defend, 
and explain that outcome. It is therefore fully appropriate that the process of 
constructing and refi ning those reasons should have a demonstrable capacity to 
move judges from one “outcome-plus-reasons” fragment of the Court to another.
I. DECISION-DELIVERY ON THE MODERN SUPREME 
COURT OF CANADA
Th e higher appeal courts in common law and other countries are routinely panel 
courts (that is, more than one judge sits to hear appeals, with the decision being 
made by a majority of the panel), but it is unclear what the implication of this 
multiplicity of judges is supposed to be for the delivery of decisions and reasons. 
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At one time, the common expectation was that each judge on the panel would 
deliberate separately, reach an independent conclusion (with those conclusions 
accumulated as votes to determine whether or not the appeal succeeded), and 
write independent reasons supporting that conclusion (with the central meaning 
of the precedent that had been established to emerge from its subsequent use by 
later courts10). Th ese independent decisions were known as seriatim decisions. 
Th is was the style of the English House of Lords and continues to be employed 
by its modern successor, the United Kingdom Supreme Court; it was the style of 
the United States Supreme Court before Chief Justice John Marshall;11 and it is 
still the style of the High Court of Australia, especially on constitutional matters. 
As Justice L’Heureux-Dubé has pointed out, this was once the dominant style of 
the SCC as well, although this practice clearly went into decline after the 1920s 
in favour of a smaller number of reasons per case and an increasing tendency for 
judgments by clear majorities.12
At the other extreme, it is sometimes the case that the several judges on a 
panel must, even if they disagree at deliberations, unite behind a single offi  cial 
statement of the outcome and the reasons supporting it.13 Th ere is often a formal 
requirement for this single voice in the appeal courts of civil law countries; it was 
also long the practice of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,14 although 
in recent decades this body has allowed the publication of minority reasons. Todd 
Henderson has suggested that both the choice of a particular style along this 
continuum, and changes in that style from one period to another, are not incidental 
10. “[T]he actual precedential value of a decision could be determined only by stitching 
together the reasoning of the judges in the majority ... . What became precedent under these 
circumstances depended on what subsequent justices calculated had been done in earlier 
series of opinions. Th ere was, in eff ect, no precedent until a later majority declared what it 
was.” Michael J Gerhardt, Th e Power of Precedent (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
at 62.
11. See e.g. Scott Douglas Gerber, Seriatim: Th e Supreme Court before John Marshall (New York: 
New York University Press, 1998).
12. Th e Honourable Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, “Th e Length and Plurality of Supreme Court of 
Canada Decisions” (1990) 28:3 Alta L Rev 581 at 584-85.
13. As Orth has pointed out, the fact that the procedures of these panel appeal courts so 
routinely seek to have an odd number of judges leads to the conclusion that division between 
the judges is suffi  ciently possible that the inconclusive embarrassment of an equal division is 
something to be precluded in advance, and this is in itself a non-trivial statement about the 
nature of law and the role of the court. See John V Orth, How Many Judges Does it Take to 
Make a Supreme Court? and Other Essays on Law and the Constitution (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2006) at 11.
14. To be sure, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is a “quasi-court” rather than a pure 
court, and one that explained the practice in terms of its advisory role vis-à-vis the Crown.
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or idiosyncratic epiphenomena; rather, they must be understood in terms of their 
legal and political contexts as well as the perceived role of the court.15
For the SCC, as for its counterparts in other countries, the conventions 
surrounding the delivery of reasons have steadily evolved.16 In this and in many 
other respects, the Laskin Court was a major watershed, experimenting with a 
variety of decision-reporting formats, including a short-lived “the majority”/“the 
minority” format, while moving toward its historically high degree of unanimity 
and clarity in directly and expressly identifying the judgment of the Court. As 
I have suggested elsewhere,17 a new uniform format clearly emerged in the early 
years of the Lamer Court that continues to be used today. Th is involved two 
important elements. 
First, a very large majority of all judgments are divided into sections with 
generic labels: Introduction or Background; Th e Facts; Th e Relevant Statutory/
Constitutional Provisions; Th e Actions of the Lower Courts; Th e Issues; Analysis; 
Conclusion or Outcome. Some of the sections—especially the Analysis—may be 
further divided into subsections with content-specifi c labels. Th e transitional practices 
of the Dickson Court may largely be categorized as following this format simply 
by assuming that at the appropriate place the label “Analysis” is inserted and by 
treating the subsequent content-specifi c labels as subdivisions.
Second, minority reasons acquire their own self-consciously secondary format 
and style, which include three elements. Th ey acknowledge the primacy of the 
majority reasons (“I have read the reasons”); they soften the edge of their 
disagreement with explicitly respectful terms (“but with respect I cannot agree”); 
and they limit their disagreement to one or more specifi c elements of the larger 
package (“with regard to [specifi c legal issue]”). Th e minority does not repeat the 
more objective introductory elements of a full decision (background, facts, law, 
actions lower courts, issues before the Court), nor do they normally incorporate a 
complete analysis. Instead, they piggy-back on these parts of the majority reasons 
to highlight the specifi c points of disagreement. Th is truncated format is one reason 
15. M Todd Henderson, “From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Th eory of Dissent” 
(2007) Sup Ct Rev 283 at 287. See also “From Consensus to Collegiality: Th e Origins of the 
‘Respectful’ Dissent,” Note, (2011) 124:5 Harv L Rev 1305.
16. For example, the current USSC format of a division into “Parts,” such that each justice can 
choose to sign on to some “Parts” but not to others, only emerged in the 1920s and became 
the standard format in the 1940s. See B Rudolph Delson, “Typography in the U.S. Reports 
and Supreme Court Voting Protocols” (2001) 76:4 NYUL Rev 1203.
17. For a more extensive presentation of this argument, see Peter McCormick, “Structures of 
Judgment: How the Modern Supreme Court of Canada Organizes Its Reasons” (2009) 32:1 
Dal LJ 35.
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why minority reasons are usually shorter—sometimes considerably so—than the 
majority judgments to which they attach.18
Th is distinctive format is not an obvious development in any simple sense, 
let alone an inevitable one; nothing similar has emerged in the other comparable 
common law national high courts. Th e SCC has more recently taken a further 
step: It is now reasonably common for the majority reasons to include comments 
(sometimes in a separately labeled section or subsection) directly addressing the 
concerns raised in the minority reasons.19 Th e combined eff ect of these developments 
is to give even divided decisions the logical format of a single, internally coherent 
structure, all the more easily read now that the Supreme Court Reports have (since 
2005) reported the judgment fi rst, concurrences second, and dissents third 
(replacing the earlier practice of presenting the various sets of reasons in order 
of the seniority of the writing judge). Th e decisions delivered by the modern 
SCC are therefore a unique package with clear internal markers identifying the 
relationship of the various elements to one another, and this is the development 
that allows one to identify the cases that will be discussed in this article, namely 
the “swing” judgments.
II. DISAGREEMENT: DISSENTS AND CONCURRENCES
My discussion will include and give equal weight to both forms of disagreement 
on the Court—dissents and separate concurrences.20 On its face, a dissent is the 
18. Given that most readers have reacted to my “shorter reasons” comment by thinking of some 
of the long minority reasons they have read, I will link my “minority reasons are shorter” 
generalization to my basic theme by noting that almost all of the long sets of minority 
reasons that appear in the Supreme Court Reports are examples of the swing phenomenon that 
I will be defi ning and defending in this article.
19. See e.g. Ontario (Attorney General) v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 SCR 3 [Fraser]. Here, 
the judgment of Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice LeBel includes a subsection entitled 
“Response to Justice Deschamps” (ibid at paras 49-51) and another titled “Response to 
Justice Rothstein” (ibid at paras 52-60).
20. Th ere is actually a third type of disagreement, the dubitante reasons, which indicate doubts 
about the majority reasons that are not serious enough to justify dissent. See Jason J 
Czarnezki, “Th e Dubitante Opinion” (2006) 39:1 Akron L Rev 1. Th ere have been a number 
of such reasons earlier in the history of the Court, the most recent being R v Henderson. See 
[1948] SCR 226, 5 CR 112. It is also indicated in Neil that there were dubitante reasons in 
the Court of Appeal decision on the case under consideration. See R v Neil, [1957] SCR 685, 
26 CR 281. Similarly, in Fergusson it is mentioned that a member of the Court was dubitante 
as to the Court’s jurisdiction on the application for leave to appeal. See R v Fergusson, [1962] 
SCR 229, 36 CR 271.
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most serious form of disagreement because it suggests that the majority got the 
outcome wrong by allowing the wrong party to win on the appeal. Th e Supreme 
Court itself implicitly reinforces this impression by providing its own statistics 
on how many decisions were and were not unanimous as to outcome, with no 
parallel data on how many were or were not unanimous as to the reasons—as if 
the latter did not matter enough to deserve reporting. I have problems with 
this assumption.
Th e Court’s responsibility is to provide a fi nal legal determination as to 
which of the parties to a legal dispute deserves to prevail—that is to say, it is very 
much in the “decision” business. But it has the concomitant responsibility of 
explaining the law and the reasoning that justify the outcome—that demonstrably 
and conclusively make that outcome the appropriate result. And it must do so in 
a way that provides clear direction to lower courts and future litigants as to what 
the law is with respect to that particular question and closely related ones. Th at is 
to say, it is also in the “reasons” business. I suggest that except for the immediate 
parties (and sometimes even for them) it is these reasons—the directions they 
include, the shadow they cast over the future decisions of the Court and other 
courts—that is the real point of carrying an appeal all the way to this highest 
level. Th e judges know this, and they must constantly balance the desirability of 
a clear statement of the law (if not a unanimous decision, then one supported by 
as large a majority as possible) against the fact that they may not completely agree 
with their colleagues on precisely what that statement should look like. I assume 
that separate concurrences do not represent complete candour about every detail 
of the reasons, and that diff erences must pass a certain threshold of signifi cance 
before they are aired at the expense of the fi rmness and clarity of the decision as a 
whole. If this is the case, the fact that a judge chooses to write separate minority 
reasons, whether concurring or dissenting, must be taken seriously; to say anything 
else is to insult the judges who made the choice.21
Moreover, although one can fi nd occasional examples of separate concurrences 
that simply echo the majority reasons or that make minor “I would just add ...” 
21. I make this point at some length because some reviewers of the manuscript objected to the 
idea that a swing judgment matters even if it did not result in a diff erent outcome. It seems 
to me that this is very close to saying that the only thing that matters in a SCC decision is 
the outcome, and that the reasons do not matter at all—something with which I cannot 
agree. It seems to me that the concept of precedent is built on the notion that the reasons 
matter because only reasons can constitute precedent. If this is so, then it must matter that 
a set of concurring reasons has gained the judgment because those become the reasons that 
direct future decisions.
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comments, most of them are much more substantive and their implications for 
the future more signifi cant.22 Th is is especially true of separate concurrences that 
open with the apparently innocuous but in fact deeply portentous, “I reach the 
same outcome, but for diff erent reasons.” Th ese typically signal a very substantial 
disagreement with the majority and support for a doctrinal trail that works quite 
diff erently and would direct quite diff erent consequences when projected into 
future cases. Th is is demonstrated by those sets of companion cases where slightly 
diff erent factual circumstances can turn a concurrence in one case into a dissent 
(by the same judge or judges, for the same substantive reasons) in an accompanying 
case.23 Certainly I see no point in suggesting that the minority reasons of Justices 
McLachlin (as she then was) and L’Heureux-Dubé in Gladstone are less noteworthy 
or possess less possible signifi cance for the future than those in Van der Peet simply 
because the former takes the form of a separate concurrence and the latter a dissent. 
It is worth noting as well that there has been a recent surge of research on separate 
concurring opinions in the United States, much of it arguing that they deserve 
more attention and give more indications of the future directions of doctrine 
than has long been assumed.24
22. See Peter McCormick, “Th e Choral Court: Separate Concurrence and the McLachlin Court 
2000–2004” (2005) 37:1 Ottawa L Rev 1; and Peter McCormick, “Standing Apart: Separate 
Concurrence and the Modern Supreme Court of Canada, 1984–2006” (2008) 53:1 McGill 
LJ 137.
23. My examples would include the three cases of the Van der Peet trilogy, and the twice-
dissenting-but-once-concurring minority reasons of Justices McLachlin (as she then was) 
and L’Heureux-Dubé. See R v Van der Peet [1996] 2 SCR 507, 50 CR (4th) 1 [Van der Peet]; 
Ogg-Moss, supra note 8; and R v Gladstone [1996] 2 SCR 723, 50 CR (4th) 111 [Gladstone]. 
Another would be the fi rst-concurring-then-dissenting performance of Justice Abella in the 
companion cases of Pecore v Pecore and Madsen Estate v Saylor. See 2007 SCC 17, [2007] 
1 SCR 795 [Pecore]; and 2007 SCC 18, [2007] SCR 838 [Saylor]. In Saylor, Justice Abella 
makes my point precisely when she states, “In Pecore, the diff erence in our legal approaches 
did not lead me to a diff erent result. In this appeal, it does” (ibid at para 33).
24. See e.g. Nancy Maveety, “Concurrence and the Study of Judicial Behavior in American 
Political Science” (2003) 8 Juridica Int’l 173; Nancy Maveety, “Th e Era of the Choral Court” 
(2005) 89:3 Judicature 138; Lori Beth Way & Charles C Turner, “Disagreement on the 
Rehnquist Court: Dynamics of Supreme Court Concurrence” (2006) 34:3 Am Pol Res 293; 
Nancy Maveety, Charles C Turner & Lori Beth Way, “Th e Rise of the Choral Court: Use of 
Concurrence in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts” (2010) 63:3 Pol Res Q 627; Charles C 
Turner, Lori Beth Way & Nancy Maveety, “Beginning to Write Separately: Th e Origin and 
Development of Concurring Judicial Opinions” (2010) 35:2 J Sup Ct Hist 93; and Pamela C 
Corley, Concurring Opinion Writing on the U.S. Supreme Court (New York: State University of 
New York Press, 2011).
MCCORMICK, LOSING THE MAJORITY 103
III. IDENTIFYING SWING JUDGMENTS
I have suggested that the judges who are designated at conference as writing the 
reasons for the majority adopt a consistent and specifi c “standard format” that is 
divided into a regular set of labeled sections and that minority reasons self-identify 
and self-locate (“have read the reasons” “with respect” “with regard to [x]”) via 
a more compact format. If this is so, then it is not hard to decipher what has 
happened when we fi nd a long dissent (or separate concurrence) that includes 
all the labeled elements attached to a short judgment that begins, “I have read 
the reasons of my colleague, but with respect I cannot agree.” Th is is what I will 
call a swing judgment: One or more of the judges who supported one position 
at conference has now been persuaded to join what was initially a minority 
position but now enjoys the support and the signatures of a majority of the panel. 
Note the two elements of this package: fi rst, a set of minority reasons that looks 
like (that is, follows the standard format of ) a majority judgment; and second, 
a judgment that looks like (is shorter and uses the introductory self-labeling of ) 
minority reasons and presents itself as such. When both are clearly present, we 
have what I will call a “pure” swing.
Consider, for example, the decision in Reference Re Public Service Employee 
Relations Act (Alberta),25 the lead case of the labour trilogy.26 Th e judgment starts 
off  with reasons written by the Chief Justice, beginning with a short introduction 
followed by a statement of the questions referred to the Alberta Court of Appeal, 
the statutory and constitutional provisions, and a summary of that court’s 
decision.27 Th ere follows an extended string of smaller sections with content-
specifi c labels that are not grouped under a mega-section called “Analysis,” but 
they could (and today they would) be. Th ese reasons, some twenty thousand 
words long, end with a “Conclusion” of which the last sentence is “Th e appeal 
should be allowed.” But in the Supreme Court Reports the opinion is introduced 
as “Th e reasons of Dickson C.J. and Wilson were delivered by the Chief Justice 
(dissenting).”28 Th is is not the judgment after all, although it was clearly written 
with that intention. Whatever the Chief Justice thought he was doing as he drafted 
his reasons, ultimately he wrote a dissent with a single accompanying signature.
25. [1987] 1 SCR 313, 38 DLR (4th) 161 [Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations 
Act (Alberta)].
26. Th e other two cases of the trio are Public Service Alliance of Canada v Canada and Retail, 
Wholesale and Department Store Union v Saskatchewan. See [1987] 1 SCR 424, 38 DLR (4th) 
249; and [1987] 1 SCR 460, 38 DLR (4th) 277.
27. Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), supra note 25 at paras 1-21.
28. Ibid at para 1.
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Some pages later, one fi nds the reasons of Justice McIntyre, whose fi rst 
sentence declares “I have read the reasons for judgment prepared in this appeal 
by the Chief Justice.”29 In the settled practice of the Court, it is bad form for 
minority reasons to be written until after the initial draft judgment has been 
circulated,30 so “I have read the reasons” is the clearest possible signal for “I am 
not writing the initial judgment.” Justice McIntyre notes that the Chief Justice 
has dealt with the facts, the legislative and constitutional provisions, and the 
reference questions themselves, and has also summarized the decision of the Alberta 
Court of Appeal, such that “[i]t will not be necessary for me to deal further with 
those matters.”31 In ten thousand words he then develops his own distinctly 
diff erent conception of freedom of association as that notion is entrenched in 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms32 (essentially, the freedom to do in 
association only those things that one is already free to do as an individual) and 
concludes that he would dismiss the appeal.
But Justice McIntyre’s is not the judgment either—ultimately, these are solo 
concurring reasons. Sandwiched between Chief Justice Dickson’s lengthy 
“dissent-that-doesn’t-know-it-is-a-dissent” and Justice McIntyre’s reasons are 
four short paragraphs (six hundred words) that constitute “the judgment of Beetz, 
Le Dain and La Forest,” delivered by Justice Le Dain.33 Justice Le Dain acknowledges 
the reasons delivered by both Chief Justice Dickson and Justice McIntyre; Justice 
Le Dain agrees with the latter on the basic issue and the answers to the constitutional 
reference questions, but he makes additional comments on the nature and extent 
of the Charter right of freedom of association. Th is judgment includes the casual 
aside that has so annoyed the labour movement ever since—that is, that collective 
bargaining rights are not fundamental human rights but “merely” the products of 
legislation;34 these reasons have represented the Court’s basic take on freedom of 
association until they were abruptly repudiated35 in B.C. Health Services.36
29. Ibid at para 143.
30. See Ian Green et al, Final Appeal: Decision-making in Canadian Courts of Appeal (Toronto: 
James Lorimer & Co, 1998) at 121.
31. Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), supra note 25 at para 143.
32. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 
[Charter].
33. Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), supra note 25 at para 139 
[emphasis added].
34. Ibid at para 153.
35. Although the divided decision in Fraser suggests that the future status of this precedent is 
rather in doubt.
36. Health Services and Support—Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v British Columbia, 2007 
SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391 [BC Health Services].
MCCORMICK, LOSING THE MAJORITY 105
My point is this: Th e decision-delivery style of the modern SCC is such that 
we can normally identify which of the judges left the judicial conference with 
the responsibility of writing for the majority, even if someone else ultimately 
delivers the reasons that come to carry the label “the judgment” in the Supreme 
Court Reports.37 Th e original majority writer signals this status with the “full 
format” reasons, and the original minority writer with “I have read the reasons.” 
What is intriguing in this particular case is that the judgment seems to have 
swung not once but twice—fi rst, Justice McIntyre drew the signatures away from 
Chief Justice Dickson such that the appeal was dismissed rather than allowed; 
then, Justice Le Dain drew the signatures away from Justice McIntyre, such that 
the latter’s extended reasons ended up as a solo separate concurrence while the 
former’s much shorter reasons became the judgment of the Court. We know it 
happened this way because the judges tell us so: Justice McIntyre responds to 
Chief Justice Dickson’s “reasons for judgment” but not vice versa, and Justice 
Le Dain states that he has read both of their reasons, explicitly placing himself 
third in the temporal sequence. Ultimately, the reasons for judgment in one of 
the longest decisions of the Dickson Court—more than thirty thousand words of 
analysis and discussion in total—are only six hundred words long.
If this case were unique, there would be no need to belabour this description—
but it is not. Limiting the count to unambiguous examples of the phenomenon 
and leaving aside a number of tempting but marginal “maybes” and “almosts,” 
in all there are 166 decisions of the Dickson, Lamer, and McLachlin Courts that 
show these basic features. Th e transparent loss of the majority in this, the lead 
case of the very important labour trilogy, and a judge who was initially writing a 
minority opinion seizing of the opportunity to set the law on a major question 
of constitutional meaning, is not unusual but rather something that happens 
dozens of times.
IV. DOUBLE-JUDGMENT CASES: THE OTHER SET OF SWING 
JUDGMENTS
Th ere is another set of SCC decisions that has long puzzled me—those that I 
am now calling “double judgment” decisions. Th e label is not quite apt: In each 
37. Th is is also a practice with its own history. In the 1960s, all sets of reasons were introduced 
as “the judgment” of the judges in question, and it is only more recently that the term 
“judgment” has been applied specifi cally to the majority with the others being described as 
“the reasons” of the judges in question.
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of these cases, there is only a single set of reasons supported by a majority of the 
panel and carrying the label of “the judgment” in the Supreme Court Reports.38 
But in each of them there is also a second set of reasons following what I have 
called “full decision” format—absolutely free-standing with its own statement of 
the background, the facts, the actions of the lower courts, the relevant statutes, 
and the issues to be dealt with, followed by a full analysis and conclusion. Typically, 
the two sets of reasons make no reference to each other at all (not even the “I 
have read the reasons” introduction that Ian Greene has identifi ed as “good form” 
for the circulation of draft reasons).39 On the face of it, either could serve equally 
satisfactorily as a majority judgment. In terms of my markers from the previous 
section, there is still a set of minority reasons that looks exactly like the standard, 
full format of a modern Supreme Court decision, but in these cases the judgment 
of the Court now has precisely the same appearance rather than using the 
standard introductory format of modern minority reasons.
My “poster child” example is Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem,40 the Supreme 
Court’s second major statement41 about the meaning of freedom of religion 
under the Charter. Justices Iacobucci and Bastarache both wrote sets of reasons, 
which were remarkably parallel not only in overall length (twelve thousand fi ve 
hundred and twelve thousand words respectively) but also in the sequence and 
the length of their various elements. Both fully exemplify the standard format 
mentioned above. Justice Iacobucci, organizing his discussion of freedom of religion 
around the question of the sincerity of religious beliefs, had four colleagues sign 
onto his reasons; Justice Bastarache, preferring to conceptualize that freedom 
in terms of the orthodoxy of religious beliefs, had only two.42 Th is means that 
Justice Iacobucci’s is a majority judgment and Justice Bastarache’s is a dissenting 
minority opinion. However, there is nothing in the appearance, tone, or the 
content of either set of reasons such that it would make any less sense if they were 
simply swapped.43
38. I should note that there is one genuine “double judgment” decision in the Supreme Court 
Reports, namely Comité paritaire de l’industrie de la chemise v Potash, which has two complete 
sets of reasons both supported by a majority of the judges on the panel, a phenomenon that 
is made possible by the fact that two judges on the panel signed on to both sets of reasons. 
See [1994] 2 SCR 406, 115 DLR (4th) 702. I think of this as a one-of-a-kind episode, and 
do not attribute it to the swing phenomenon described in this article.
39. Greene, supra note 1 at 121.
40. 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 SCR 551 [Amselem].
41. R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd being the fi rst. See [1985] 1 SCR 295, 18 DLR (4th) 321.
42. Th e ninth member of the panel was Justice Binnie, who wrote short reasons suggesting that 
there was no genuine Charter issue in the fi rst place. Amselem, supra note 40 at para 182.
43. As Justice Bastarache still very much wishes they had been; when I had the occasion to 
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I wondered for some time what could account for this curious behaviour. 
It seems strange that the two judges would spend so much time writing largely 
duplicative “Introduction” and “Facts” and “Courts Below” sections, diff ering 
only in slight details and emphasis. Normally, even minority reasons that express 
vigorous disagreement simply adopt these elements from the judgment either 
implicitly or explicitly. It is also unusual for minority reasons to contain a 
complete and free-standing analysis section, as opposed to identifying the specifi c 
contained elements of the judgment’s analysis with which they diff er.
It seems to me that a variant of the standard swing judgment would explain 
this phenomenon. On the one hand, there is a set of reasons (initially majority, 
now minority) that included the full set of elements that conform to the 
now-accepted format for judgments of the Court, and the author has no reason 
to delete or to rewrite them simply because some colleagues have now defected 
to what was initially a set of minority reasons. Often, as indicated above, 
the minority reasons simply retain their original format (“I have read ...”), even 
though they have become a judgment labeled as such in the Supreme Court 
Reports. But perhaps sometimes the “new majority” writing judge is not satisfi ed 
with the incomplete and almost backhanded nature of these reasons (“I agree 
with the other set of reasons except for those specifi c elements I here indicate 
explicitly”), which becomes more problematic as the original majority reasons get 
longer and the originally drafted minority reasons get shorter. Th e extreme case 
is VW v DS,44 where then Justice McLachlin’s twenty-fi ve word sentence becomes 
a swing judgment, trumping Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s fi fteen thousand words 
on the issue of the wrongful removal of a child. Th is makes the case frustrating 
to read: Justice McLachlin (as she then was) declares that, subject to her reasons 
in another case,45 she agrees with L’Heureux-Dubé’s solitary reasons—but this 
means that the very long concurrence now has to be fi ltered through that earlier 
decision to see which elements stand as part of the current judgment.46 Perhaps 
in some cases the judgment-gaining judge’s choice is to extend the courtesy of 
a fully articulated, free standing, and internally coherent set of reasons for what 
speak to him (when he chaired an IRPP Round-table on Senate Reform in October 2010), 
he indicated that this dissent was the set of reasons that he thought was one of the most 
important that he had written while serving on the Court.
44. [1996] 2 SCR 108, 134 DLR (4th) 481 [W v S].
45. Gordon v Goertz, [1996] 2 SCR 27, 134 DLR (4th) 321.
46. All the more problematic because it gets the citation of that earlier case wrong—the year 
and the page number are correct, but the volume number is not 1 (as stated in W v S and 
repeated in the “cases cited”) but rather 2. See W v S, supra note 44 at para 1.
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is now the judgment of the Court by re-writing them from scratch. Th is would 
explain the “two judgment” appearance; I do not know what else might do so.47 
In all, there are eighty-nine decisions by the Dickson, Lamer, and McLachlin 
courts that qualify unambiguously as double judgment cases, seventy-seven of 
which are dissents and twelve of which are separate concurrences. Henceforth, I 
will not be keeping the “pure swing” and “double judgment” sets of cases separate 
for purposes of analysis and discussion; I will instead be talking about the full set 
of 255 swing judgment cases during these three chief justiceships.
V. DO SWING JUDGMENTS HAPPEN OFTEN ENOUGH TO 
MATTER?
In all, there have been 255 swing judgments during the last three chief justiceships, 
or just under ten per year.48 Table 1 shows the relative frequency for each of 
the three Chief Justices. Th e initial impression it gives is that the phenomenon 
was more pronounced under Chief Justices Dickson and Lamer but is declining 
under Chief Justice McLachlin, and that this decline is especially true of concurrence 
swings, which I shall discuss further below.
47. To qualify this slightly: In the aftermath of the publication of Doris Anderson’s excellent 
biography of Bertha Wilson, there were a number of media interviews in which some of 
Wilson’s colleagues admitted that there had been times when Justice Wilson was assigned the 
writing of reasons at conference, but when “the boys” got together afterward, they decided 
that one of them should write it instead and went ahead without informing Wilson of this 
fact promptly. On a similar note, see Jamie Cameron, “Justice in Her Own Right: Bertha 
Wilson and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2008) 41 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 
371 at 373. Th is could explain some of the “double judgments” that involve Wilson, though 
I doubt that it can be generalised.
48. Th is is rather more than the “two or three times a year” that some judges suggested to 
Donald Songer. See Donald Songer, Th e Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada: An 
Empirical Examination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) at 136. Even if these 
judges only had the dissent swings in mind when they responded to this question, the better 
estimate would still be six per year.
TABLE 1: NUMBER OF SWING JUDGMENTS, BY CHIEF JUSTICESHIP
Chief Justice Concurrence  Swing judgments
Dissent Swing 
Judgments
All Swing 
Judgments Swing J’s Per year
Dickson 23 45 68 11.0
Lamer 40 70 110 11.6
McLachlin 18 59 77 7.0
Total 81 174 255 9.6
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Th e number 255 must of course be put in context, and the critical question 
is how to defi ne this context. Over the last quarter-century the Court has handled 
about one hundred cases per year on average. Th is number drifted higher in 
the 1990s, peaking at just over 130 per year; then (as in the United States) the 
numbers began a long-term downward slide. In 2006, the Court decided only 
fi fty-nine cases, and this number was even lower in 2007 (fi fty-fi ve cases, all panel 
decisions). It is not clear what is driving this downward trend (which means that 
the numbers may rebound), but for present purposes the long-term average of 
one hundred cases per year will do. On average there are about ten swing cases 
per year, which seems to be a modest but not insignifi cant proportion. More 
precisely, in the last twenty-seven years since the appointment of Chief Justice 
Dickson, the Court has handed down just under two thousand fi ve hundred 
decisions, of which 255 have been swing judgments.
But the total number of decisions is perhaps not the right basis for comparison. 
Th e Supreme Court of Canada still has an “appeal by right” jurisdiction, which 
means that some cases are automatically entitled to a hearing without clearing the 
relevance hurdle of an application for leave.49 Th rough the 1990s, this category 
accounted for one-third of the Court’s caseload, though it has declined somewhat 
in the new century. Some of these cases were such that an application for leave to 
appeal would almost certainly have been granted had it been required, but many 
were clearly less signifi cant. Hundreds of SCC decisions are oral, from-the-bench 
decisions delivered the same day as oral argument, and these are almost always 
formulaic responses low on informational content.50 In 2000, for example, these 
accounted for one decision in every six, not one of which drew reasons that 
exceeded one thousand words (most were under one hundred), and this proportion 
was considerably higher (routinely around one-third) for the Lamer Court. More 
usefully then, during the three chief justiceships there were just over one thousand 
nine hundred cases reserved for judgment, of which “swing” decisions represent 
about one in every eight. Th ese are very much in the same ballpark as Brenner’s 
fi ndings for the USSC; on the Vinson Court, a voting change transformed a 
49. At present, there is an appeal by right in a criminal case when a provincial court of appeal 
allows a Crown appeal from an acquittal, or when there is a dissent on the provincial court 
of appeal on a matter of law. See Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 s 691. Th ere is also an 
appeal by right on “reference cases” decided by provincial courts of appeal. See Supreme Court 
Act, RSC 1985, c S-26 s 36.
50. Th e “pure” form of this formula is the single sentence: “Th e appeal is dismissed for the 
reasons given in the Court below.”
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minority into a majority 8.5 per cent of the time.51 Th e fi gures for the Warren 
Court were considerably higher, at 16 per cent.52 Th e 13.4 per cent that I have 
found for the three most recent Canadian chief justiceships falls just in between.
Perhaps we should focus on an even smaller set of cases. Th e SCC is 
considerably more likely to hand down a unanimous decision than is the USSC. 
Less than a thousand cases in the last twenty-seven years have involved one or 
more sets of minority reasons and, virtually by defi nition, these are the only cases 
where the swing phenomenon is at play in any sense that can be identifi ed by my 
methodology.53 Th is is a considerably smaller data set than the full caseload (not 
quite 40 per cent) as well as the reserved judgment caseload (less than half ) with 
the logical consequence that swing judgments loom much larger on this more 
limited landscape. Table 2 collects these fi gures to provide a more focused look at 
the signifi cance of the swing judgments.
One striking aspect of these numbers is the very large number of same-day, 
oral, from-the-bench decisions for the Lamer Court, amounting to one-third 
of the case load (most of them appeals by right). In contrast, oral decisions 
accounted for only one-sixth of the Dickson Court caseload and one-eighth for 
the McLachlin Court. Th is means that current discussions about the vanishing 
caseload of the McLachlin Court are somewhat overstated, because much of what 
has been vanishing are the formulaic appeals by right; the reserved judgments, 
which are the bulk of the Court’s workload, have declined only slightly from 68.4 
per year for the Lamer Court to 63.2 per year under Chief Justice McLachlin 
51. Saul Brenner, “Fluidity on the United States Supreme Court: A Reexamination” (1980) 24:3 
AJPS 526. Th is is actually a composite number; it is noted that 61 per cent of all cases saw 
a change in vote (ibid at 529) and that in 14 per cent of these cases the result was to turn a 
minority into a majority (ibid at 530). 
52. Saul Brenner, “Fluidity on the Supreme Court: 1956–1967” (1982) 26:2 AJPS 388 at 390.
53. Although we do know that at least some decisions that appear straightforward on their face 
were actually swing judgments. See supra note 7 (commentary within).
TABLE 2: RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF SWING JUDGMENTS, BY CHIEF JUSTICESHIP
Chief Justice All cases
Reserved
Judgments
 
Non-unanimous
cases
Swing
Judgments
Swing as % of
non-unanimous
Dickson 669 553 234 68 29.1%
Lamer 969 650 381 110 28.9%
McLachlin 820 727 307 77 25.1%
Total 2458 1930 922 255 27.7%
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(although both are well down from the 92.2 per year of the Dickson Court). But 
what does distinguish the McLachlin Court from its immediate predecessor is 
a steep rise in unanimity rates, now accounting for 57.8 per cent of all reserved 
judgments as compared to 41.4 per cent under Chief Justice Lamer.
Th e suggestion with which this section began, namely that swing judgments 
are lower under Chief Justice McLachlin than under previous chief justices, is 
therefore the result (partly) of the lower reserved judgment caseload and (to a 
larger extent) of a higher unanimity rate within that caseload. But, as the fi nal 
column in Table 2 demonstrates, there is a solid continuity that runs through 
all three chief justiceships: namely, a substantial and persisting share of all 
non-unanimous reserved cases—between 25 and 30 per cent—results in swing 
judgments. In this constrained but still signifi cant way, the swing judgment is a 
persisting rather than declining phenomenon.
Th is seems quite remarkable, to the extent that we should perhaps rethink 
the standard list of motivations that direct the writing of minority reasons. Some 
have suggested that judges write minority reasons in order to speak to the future;54 
sometimes minority reasons are clearly and consciously the “last gasp” of the 
past;55 sometimes (as in the relentless repetition of the Marshall/Brennan “death 
penalty dissents” in the USSC) they embody a conscious strategy;56 sometimes 
they identify rogues or mavericks on the court;57 and sometimes they are seen as 
signals to a broader public.58 But based on these numbers, there is another, much 
more practical, reason for writing minority reasons—namely, a modest but real 
chance of winning over enough colleagues to write a judgment of the Court, 
something that has happened in fully one-quarter of all non-unanimous decisions.
Put a little diff erently: If the current Court is deciding sixty-three reserved 
cases per year, then the “fair share” of the notional average judge is one-ninth of 
sixty-three, or seven judgments per year. (Th e assignment of the writing of reasons 
is rather more complex than any simple rotation, of course, but the point stands.) 
54. Th e Honourable Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, “Th e Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future?” 
(2000) 38:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 495.
55. Antonin Scalia, “Th e Dissenting Opinion” (1994) J Sup Ct Hist 33.
56. Michael Mello, “Adhering to Our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshall and the 
Relentless Dissent to Death as a Punishment” (1995) 22:3 Fla St UL Rev 591.
57. Christine Kexel Chabot & Benjamin Remy Chabot, “Mavericks, Moderates, or Drifters? 
Supreme Court Voting Alignments 1838-2009” (2011) 76:4 Mo L Rev 9999.
58. Tonja Jacobi, “Th e Judicial Signaling Game: How Judges Strategically Shape Th eir Dockets” 
(2008) 16:1 Sup Ct Econ L Rev 1 at 4; Vanessa A Baird, Answering the Call of the Court: How 
Justices and Litigants Set the Supreme Court Agenda (Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, 2007) at 58-59.
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But this is roughly the same as the number of swing judgments that the Court 
has averaged per year, even under the current Chief Justice, and many of the 
swing judgments occur in major cases that generate a signifi cant citation trail. If 
a string of unanimous decisions suggests that judges are patiently waiting their 
turn for the direct impact of the lead authorship and settling in the meantime 
for the more modest infl uence of commenting on the circulated draft judgment, 
then swing judgments invoke, if you will, the image of queue-jumping, and this 
tactic has been rather more successful over the last quarter-century than I would 
have expected. 
Th e votes and signatures of SCC judges are considerably less solid after 
conference than one might think, and judges who are assigned the writing 
of majority judgments on divided panels have to take the comments of their 
colleagues very seriously while paying real attention to keeping the signatures 
in place for their evolving draft reasons. Th is in turn suggests that we should 
not think of the “write and circulate” part of normal SCC procedure as being 
straightforward and routine; the real possibility of swing judgments means that 
this process matters very much indeed.
VI. SWING JUDGMENTS: WHO GAINS AND WHO LOSES
Just as not all cases are swing judgments, not all judges are necessarily equally 
likely to be involved in swing judgments, either by losing the majority to a 
colleague or by persuading the majority away. Th e breakdown of the frequency 
of swing judgments by judge is gathered in Table 3; I will discuss each of the 
columns in this Table in turn. Th e order of the names is driven by a “total swings” 
(gains plus losses) count, which does not appear in the Table.
My fi rst set of comments will address the fi rst three columns in Table 3, after 
which I will deal with the right hand three, and with the two center columns that 
link these two sets.
At fi rst glance, it will seem that the numbers in the Table do not quite add 
up—I have identifi ed 255 swing judgment cases and yet the Table totals only 241 
“gains” and 239 “losses.” Th e reason for this is the relatively recent and modestly 
increasing phenomenon of “joint authorships”—sets of reasons signed by several 
judges that are indicated as having been written and delivered not by a single 
lead author (the normal style of the SCC and of many other comparable courts) 
but rather by a pair, or more rarely by a trio, of judges from that bloc. Th is is an 
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TABLE 3: SWING JUDGMENTS, BY JUSTICE
Judge Gain Loss Net Wrote Minority
Assigned 
Judgment 
Gain 
Judgment 
Percentage
Lost 
Judgment 
Percentage
Swing 
Effi  ciency
McLachlin 32 27 +5 150 88 21.3% 30.7% -9.3%
La Forest 22 16 +6 113 59 19.5% 27.1% -7.6%
Lamer 17 18 -1 97 87 17.5% 20.7% -3.2%
L’Heureux-Dubé 10 25 -15 179 48 5.6% 52.1% -46.5%
Sopinka 20 11 +9 119 52 16.8% 21.2% -4.3%
Cory 17 13 +4 49 80 34.7% 16.3% 18.4%
Dickson 16 13 +3 27 36 59.3% 36.1% 23.1%
Bastarache 8 18 -10 40 48 20.0% 37.5% -17.5%
Wilson 6 18 -12 86 39 7.0% 46.2% -39.2%
Iacobucci 9 12 -3 28 45 32.1% 26.7% 5.5%
Binnie 15 5 +10 60 27 25.0% 18.4% 6.5%
Major 7 10 -3 44 41 15.9% 24.4% -8.5%
LeBel 9 6 +3 60 23 15.0% 26.1% -11.1%
McIntyre 6 8 -2 33 22 18.2% 36.4% -18.2%
Deschamps 6 8 -2 40 22 15.0% 36.4% -21.4%
Gonthier 7 6 +1 52 31 13.5% 19.4% -5.9%
Charron 4 9 -5 8 25 50.0% 36.0% 14.0%
Estey 5 4 +1 18 13 27.8% 30.8% -3.0%
Le Dain 7 1 +6 18 5 38.9% 20.0% 18.9%
Abella 3 4 -1 32 20 9.4% 20.0% -10.6%
Fish 6 0 +6 43 10 14.0% 0.0% 14.0%
Beetz 5 1 +4 22 5 22.7% 20.0% 2.7%
Arbour 2 2 0 21 13 9.5% 15.4% -5.9%
Chouinard 1 1 0 4 6 25.0% 16.7% 8.3%
Cromwell 0 2 -2 3 8 0% 25.0% -25.0%
Stevenson 0 1 -1 10 3 0% 33.3% -33.3%
Rothstein 1 0 1 11 10 9.1% 0% 9.1%
Ritchie 0 0 0 3 1 0% 0% 0%
All Judges 241 239 - 1370 867 17.6% 27.6% -10.0%
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unusual development that has been explored elsewhere.59 Fourteen of the gains 
in swing judgments resulted in co-authored reasons for judgment; sixteen of the 
losses (and therefore the “in-the-end-minority” reasons) were also co-authored. 
Th e proportion of these co-authorships, thirty out of the 510 gainers and losers 
in swing judgments (or 5.9 per cent), is roughly comparable with the 7.5 per cent 
frequency of co-authored reasons on all cases decided by the Court under the last 
three chief justiceships.60
A. COUNTING SWINGS: WINNERS AND LOSERS
Th e most obvious question about the swing judgment process is which judges 
have been the most successful at turning minority reasons into judgments of the 
Court, with the doctrinal leadership and precedential authority that this implies. 
Some judges have fared better than others in this respect—that is to say, they 
were able to sway their colleagues and gain the majority on more occasions. Th e 
spread in this respect is dramatic.
Chief Justice McLachlin easily leads the Court, having turned a minority 
into a judgment thirty-two times; she is trailed by Justice La Forest (with twenty-
two) and Justice Sopinka (with twenty), this trio accounting for almost 30 per 
cent of the total number of swings. Four other judges place in the ’teens: Chief 
Justice Lamer and Justice Cory (with seventeen each); Chief Justice Dickson 
(with sixteen); and Justice Binnie (with fi fteen). It is worth nothing that all three 
of the Chief Justices appear on this list (although the accounting for Chief Justice 
Dickson does not include his earlier service as an associate justice). Th is is 
perhaps to be expected. While Chief Justices are, as the phrase has it, fi rst among 
equals (with only the same single vote as their colleagues), they are not only equal 
but also fi rst. At the other extreme, only three judges (Justices Cromwell, Stevenson, 
and Ritchie) have never managed to swing a single judgment, and two others 
(Justices Chouinard and Rothstein) have done so only once.
One obvious aspect of the Table is the fact that the judges who top the list 
include several who served for the largest part of the period under examination; 
nevertheless, this catches only some of the longest-serving judges (McLachlin 
has served twenty-two years, Lamer served for twenty) and not others (such as 
Justices L’Heureux-Dubé, Iacobucci, Binnie, Major, and LeBel, all serving for 
thirteen years or more). Conversely, the bottom of the list is dominated by people 
whose total service, or the concluding portion of their service that fell within my 
59. Peter J McCormick, “Sharing the Spotlight: Co-authored Reasons on the Modern Supreme 
Court of Canada” (2011) 34:1 Dal LJ 165 at 169.
60. Ibid. 
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time period, or their service on the Court to date, is very short—less than two 
years for four of the fi ve.
Swing judgments are the perfect example of a zero-sum game. If somebody 
is writing majority reasons who was not assigned those reasons at conference, 
then somebody else has lost the majority and is now writing a dissent or a separate 
concurrence. Again, there is a dramatic spread in the frequency with which 
diff erent judges appear on this list: Chief Justice McLachlin leads this list as well 
with twenty-seven; followed by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé with twenty-fi ve; there 
is a three way-tie between Justices Lamer, Bastarache, and Wilson for third place 
at eighteen; and La Forest rounds out the top half-dozen with sixteen. Th ese six 
combine for just under one half of the losing side of all the judgment swings.
Half of the names in this set also appeared among the judges gaining most 
often from swing judgments—Chief Justices McLachlin and Lamer, as well as 
Justice La Forest—but the other half did not. Length of service is clearly a factor, 
but it is not the only one since the list includes only three of the eight justices 
who served for a dozen or more years during the period in question and only two 
of the three Chief Justices. Again, the presence of Chief Justices on this side of the 
swing also makes sense in that they could be expected to take on a disproportionate 
share of the diffi  cult cases where a signifi cant issue is already dividing the Court 
at conference and the initial majority position is unusually vulnerable as a result. 
Finally, to point out the awkward but obvious, it includes all three of the fi rst 
women to be appointed to the Court (while the list of top gainers includes only 
one of them).
At the other end of the Table, there are three judges who have never lost 
a majority (Justices Fish, Rothstein, and Ritchie) and four who have lost only 
one (Justices Le Dain, Beetz, Chouinard, and Stevenson). Most of these judges 
served for only a small part of the period considered and the majority of them 
were members of the Dickson Court; Justice Fish is the obvious exception, being 
a current member of the Court with a full eight years of service.
If we think of the post-conference distribution of the majority reasons for 
judgment as refl ecting some institutional determination of who should write how 
much, and more specifi cally who should write what, then swing judgments interfere 
with this allocation by taking away decisions from one justice and allowing them 
to be appropriated by another. To some extent, this imbalance cancels itself out; 
if a judge like Justice Gonthier loses seven judgments of the Court to swings, but 
gains six others by writing minority reasons that become judgments, then this 
really has not aff ected the balance.61 Only if particular judges gain signifi cantly 
61. It may be, of course, that either the lost judgments or the gained judgments involve more 
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more judgments than they lose, or vice versa, can we have some reasonable indication 
of whether they are the benefi ciaries or the losers from the phenomenon.
Only one SCC justice is in double fi gures for net gain from swings, and that 
is Justice Binnie with fi fteen gains and fi ve losses for a net gain of ten. Justice 
Sopinka is close behind with twenty gains and eleven losses for a net gain of nine. 
Th ere is a three-way tie at six net gains (Justices Le Dain, La Forest, and Fish), 
and it is interesting that this includes one judge from each of the three chief 
justiceships. Chief Justice McLachlin tops off  the fi rst half dozen with a net gain 
for fi ve despite leading the Court with an impressive thirty-two swing gains 
in total.
Th e bottom of the Table can be described in much more defi nitive terms. 
Th ere are three judges who are the clearest net losers, these being Justices 
L’Heureux-Dubé (-15), Wilson (-12), and Bastarache (-10)—again, a trio that is 
interestingly distributed over the three chief justiceships. Th e drop-off  from this 
point is suffi  ciently dramatic such that it should just be taken as identifying these 
three judges as standing out in this regard, as balanced against Justices Binnie and 
Sopinka on the positive side of the calculation.
B. SWING OPPORTUNITIES AND SWING EFFECTIVENESS
It will be fairly obvious that what the judges with the highest numbers—that is to 
say, the ones who have been most frequently involved in either gaining or losing 
judgments—have in common is length of service. Only one of the judges in the 
top half of the Table (Chief Justice Dickson) served for fewer than nine years, and 
only one of the judges in the bottom half (Justice Gonthier) served for more than 
nine. Th is could be corrected by rerunning the numbers per year of service, but 
there is a more focused way of adjusting the fi gures: taking into account not just 
the length of service but also the opportunities for gains or losses that each justice 
enjoyed. Judges create an opportunity to gain a swing judgment every time they 
choose to write minority reasons after judicial conference and the assignment of 
the judgment;62 by the same token, an opportunity to lose a swing judgment 
exists every time they are assigned the judgment and one or more of their 
colleagues indicate that they will be writing minority reasons.
important cases of more lasting signifi cance, but I am not in a position at this time to 
attempt such an assessment.
62. Which suggests another factor that may complicate the “how important is my disagreement” 
threshold, namely the question of “how good are my chances of gaining the judgment.” 
Although successful swings are to some extent a measure of how persuasive and infl uential 
particular judges may be, they may also be a product of how good judges are at “picking their 
targets.”
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As argued above, I regard the relevant universe as being limited to reserved 
judgments and non-unanimous decisions. Th e most useful question then is: How 
often did the judge in question have the majority-reasons assignment on a 
divided panel, and how large a fraction of this total is represented by the “lost 
majority” number? And, conversely, for “gained judgments,” how often did a 
particular judge write minority reasons on divided panels, and how large 
a fraction of that total is represented by the “gained majority” number? Both 
counts, of course, have to be corrected because the actual count of “judgments in 
decisions for divided panels” as they appear in the Supreme Court Reports already 
includes the gained-swing judgments, but not the lost-swing judgments. Chief 
Justice McLachlin, for example, delivered the decision in a total of ninety-three 
divided panels and wrote minority reasons in 145. However, this ninety-three 
already includes her thirty-two swing gains, which reduces the number to sixty-
one; and it does not include the twenty-seven times that she started with the 
judgment assignment but lost the majority. Th e real count should be eighty-eight 
judgment assignments and 150 instances in which she chose to write minority 
reasons. Th e numbers in the “Assigned Judgment” and “Wrote Minority” 
columns refl ect these recalculations.
On this basis, we can ask the two critical questions: fi rst, what proportion of 
the times that each judge was writing the judgment on a divided panel did that 
judge lose the majority (the “Lost Judgment Percentage” column); and second, 
what proportion of the times in which each judge chose to write minority reasons 
were they successful in winning the majority away from the initial writer (the 
“Gain Judgment Percentage” column)? Th e second number tends to be lower for 
the reason that is signalled in the “All Judges” row on the Table: On a divided 
panel there can only be one initial judgment writer, but there can be several 
diff erent sets of minority reasons.63
Th ere are several judges who stand out for the frequency with which they 
succeed in translating their minority reasons into judgments of the Court, these 
being Chief Justice Dickson (59 per cent), Justice Cory (35 per cent), and Justice 
Iacobucci (32 per cent) (and, based on a smaller numbers of cases, Justices Charron 
and Le Dain with 14 and 18.9 per cent respectively). In operational terms, put 
yourself in the position of a SCC justice who has just volunteered for or been 
assigned the majority reasons on a panel that is not clearly unanimous; the 
aforementioned judges are the colleagues that you would least want to hear say “I 
63. Because the counts in this Table exclude co-authored judgments and minority reasons, 
the Table should not be understood as suggesting that there were only 867 divided panel 
decisions or only 1370 sets of minority reasons during the three chief justiceships.
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am afraid that I may fi nd it necessary to write separately.” At the other extreme, 
there are several judges who are much less eff ective than average at gaining the 
majority, including Justices L’Heureux-Dubé (5 per cent), Wilson (6 per cent), 
Abella (9 per cent), and Arbour (10 per cent) and, based on a smaller numbers 
of cases, Justice Rothstein.
Conversely, there are some judges who are unusually eff ective at retaining 
the judgment even in the face of minority reason challenges. Th e list is of course 
led by Justice Fish, who has never lost a swing, and includes Justices Arbour (15 
per cent), Cory (16 per cent), Binnie (18 per cent), and Gonthier (19 per cent). 
Th is list is also led by Justice Rothstein, however, he has participated in less than 
20 non-unanimous panel decisions at the time of the data collection. Others, 
however, are much less successful in this respect; Justice L’Heureux-Dubé is the 
only member of the Court to lose the majority on more than half the occasions 
when she faced minority reasons, followed by Justices Wilson (46 per cent) and 
Bastarache (38 per cent).
Combining these two fi gures, the fi nal column of Table 3 uses the gain-swing 
and lose-swing numbers to generate a “swing effi  ciency” fi gure—that is, the 
percentage of the time that a judge gains the majority on a divided panel minus 
the percentage that they lose the majority in these situations. Th is is shown in the 
fi nal column of the Table. For the Table as a whole, this fi gure is negative (-10 
per cent), refl ecting the fact that there are about eight sets of minority reasons for 
every fi ve cases. Th is means that a judge who decides to write minority reasons 
does not have quite as good a chance of gaining the judgment as is suggested by 
the frequency with which judgment writers lose their majority. I have resisted the 
temptation to correct or normalise these fi gures by raising them by this 10 per 
cent because it does not seem to be the case that this lower number misrepresents 
the challenge or the accomplishment of the judges.
Because of this fi gure of -10 per cent, only one third of the judges have a 
swing effi  ciency number that is in positive territory, and this small group is led 
by Chief Justice Dickson (23 per cent), followed by Justices Le Dain (19 per 
cent), Cory (18 per cent), and Fish (14 per cent). At the other end of the scale, 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé has a swing effi  ciency number of -46 per cent, followed 
by Justices Wilson (-39 per cent), Deschamps (-21 per cent), and Bastarache (-18 
per cent). Th e diff erences between judges are considerable, and they demonstrate 
that some are particularly profi cient or fortunate in being able to take advantage 
of the very real opportunity for swing judgments after the initial conference 
assignment, while other judges are not.
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C. WOMEN JUDGES AND SWING JUDGMENTS
Th e list of the judges who have been the least successful in gaining swing 
judgments includes several of the more prominent women judges who have 
served or are now serving on the Court. Further, the list of the judges who are 
the least successful in holding on to their initial “judgment-of-the-court” assignment 
in the face of a challenge from a writer of minority reasons also includes 
several of those same prominent women judges. Even the single most impressive 
number in Table 3—Chief Justice McLachlin’s thirty-two gains through swing 
judgments, the most of any justice—turns out to be largely the product of her 
having served more years during the last three chief justiceships than anyone else 
and is off set by the fact that she has also lost more swing judgments than any 
other justice. Expressed as a percentage of opportunities, Chief Justice McLachlin 
has gained judgments slightly more often than average, but she has also lost 
judgments slightly more often than average, and her swing effi  ciency does not 
diff er signifi cantly from the fi gures of her colleagues taken as a whole. In other 
words, even the most apparently successful woman judge, when assessed in terms 
of the swing phenomenon, turns out not to have been very successful in gaining 
swings after all.
Th is raises the question of the extent to which this observation about women 
not doing well under the swing judgment phenomenon can be generalized. To 
this end Table 4 combines data from Table 3 for all seven women judges and for 
the twenty-one male judges to similarly calculate the “gained judgment” and 
“lost judgment” percentages as well as net swing effi  ciency based on total 
opportunities. As mentioned above, the gains and losses do not quite balance 
out (nor do they equal the total number of swing judgments indicated earlier) 
because of the phenomenon of joint (that is to say, co-authored) reasons. And the 
fact that the “swing effi  ciency fi gure” is negative for both men and women judges 
again refl ects the fact that although there is only one initial judgment assignment 
to be lost for each non-unanimous panel, there can be (and there often is) more 
than one set of minority reasons potentially challenging for a swing judgment. 
TABLE 4: SWING JUDGMENTS, MEN AND WOMEN JUDGES COMPARED
Gain Loss Net Wrote Minority
Assigned 
Judgment 
Gain 
Judgment 
Percentage
Lost 
Judgment 
Percentage
Swing 
Effi  ciency
Women Judges 63 93 -30 516 255 12.2% 36.5% -24.3%
Men Judges 178 146 32 854 612 20.9% 23.9% -3.0%
All Judges 241 239 - 1370 867 17.6% 27.6% -10.0%
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For the three chief justiceships as a whole, the diff erence between these two is a 
full 10 per cent, as shown in the third row (repeated from Table 3).
Th e diff erences for women judges are indeed generalizable. As a group, 
women are a third less likely than average to gain a swing judgment when 
writing minority reasons and half as likely to lose the majority when 
writing a judgment that is challenged by minority reasons. In terms of swing 
effi  ciency, male judges as a group almost break even, despite the “more-
minority reasons-than-judgments” factor mentioned above; women judges, on 
the other hand, collectively enjoy a swing effi  ciency of -24 per cent. Th e only two 
male judges who scored this low individually are Justices Stevenson and Cromwell, 
and both do so over such short periods of service and with so few cases that the 
numbers are not really comparable.
One slightly curious aspect of Table 4 is the “wrote minority” and “assigned 
judgment” columns (both, of course, referring to what happened at conference 
rather than what the totals look like post-swing). Women judges wrote 29 per 
cent of the initial judgements that were challenged by minority reasons, but they 
wrote 41 per cent of the minority reasons in divided panels. Put a bit diff erently, 
over the whole set of non-unanimous reserved judgments for three chief justiceships, 
men judges as a group wrote on average 1.4 sets of minority reasons for every 
judgment, but women wrote just over two. At fi rst glance, this cries out for a 
common sense (if slightly unfriendly) explanation, which we might carefully put 
as: Some people are just a little more ready than others to disagree, and to 
express that disagreement publicly. Examples of individual judges who might be 
described as “frequently disagreeing” or as “seldom disagreeing” will no doubt 
spring into most readers’ minds. But to put this in a broader context: Songer 
et al have studied majority opinion assignment at the Court over a comparable 
time period, and one of their strongest fi ndings was that women judges are less 
likely than their male counterparts to be assigned majority reasons—this holding 
true even when controlling for other variables, and even under a woman 
Chief Justice.64
Th is puts a diff erent face on things. One of the reasons that a judge writes 
minority reasons more often may be the fact that she enjoys relatively few 
opportunities to participate in the development of judicial doctrine through the 
writing of judgments of the court. Th is is a description that Songer et al are 
suggesting we can apply to women judges as a group. It therefore becomes more 
64. My summary comments are based on Prof. Songer’s observations in Panel 45-26 at the 
Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting in Chicago, Illinois on 13 April 2012.
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signifi cant that the swing phenomenon again reduces the extent to which women 
judges wind up writing the decisions of the Court, which is to say those sets of 
reasons that enjoy greater precedential weight.
VII. SWING JUDGMENTS AND PLURALITY DECISIONS
One problem faced by many panel appeal courts is the problem of plurality 
judgments—that is, decisions where there is no single statement of “outcome-
plus-reasons” that draws the support of a majority of the members of the panel. 
In such a situation, there is an outcome (the fact that the panels always have an 
odd number of judges, and that there are only two possible outcomes—allow 
or dismiss the appeal65—guarantees this66), but the “votes” that direct this result 
have not collected themselves in a single set of reasons, leaving one or more separate 
concurrences. Until recently it has been possible (for the most part) for the 
Supreme Court Reports to indicate one of these sets of reasons—not necessarily the 
one that has collected the largest number of signatures67—as being the judgment 
of the Court.68
In the United States, there is some question as to whether a plurality judgment 
carries precedential value at all (as opposed to simply deciding the immediate 
case) and, if so, how the substance of that precedent is to be determined.69 
65. Some courts, such as the USSC, work with three diff erent possibilities—allow the appeal, 
uphold the judgment of the lower court, or remand—and this can potentially create more 
complex problems that courts try hard to avoid. See H Ron Davidson, “Th e Mechanics of 
Judicial Vote Switching” (2004) 38:1 Suff olk UL Rev 17.
66. More precisely: almost guarantees this. Th e possibility remains that as a result of death or 
retirement a judge may sit on a panel but not be able to participate in the decision. Th ere was 
a single decision of the McLachlin Court that ended in an equal division of the panel. See R 
v LFW, 2000 SCC 6, [2000] 1 SCR 32.
67. See e.g. Lac Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd, [1989] 2 SCR 574, 61 DLR (4th) 
14 at para 123. Here, the solo reasons of Justice La Forest on a fi ve-judge panel are indicated as 
the judgment of the Court.
68. Although this is less true today: Six of the nine plurality decisions in the McLachlin Court’s 
fi rst fi ve years, but only two of eleven in the last six years, identifi ed one of the sets of reasons 
as the judgment.
69. See e.g. John F Davis & William L Reynolds “Juridical Cripples: Plurality Decisions 
in the Supreme Court” (1974) 23:1 Duke LJ 59; “Plurality Decisions and Judicial 
Decisionmaking,” Note, (1981) 94:5 Harv L Rev 1127; Ken Kimura, “A Legitimacy Model 
for the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions” (1992) 77:6 Cornell L Rev 1593; Mark Alan 
Th urmon, “When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme 
Court Plurality Decisions” (1992) 42:2 Duke LJ 419; Aaron S Hochschild, “Th e Modern 
Problem of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions: Interpretation in Historical Perspective” 
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Canadian judicial citation practice seems more casual in this regard—there are 
a number of plurality judgments that rank among the Court’s most frequently 
cited decisions.70
By my count, there have been 155 plurality decisions handed down during 
the three most recent chief justiceships: sixty-six by the Dickson Court, sixty-
seven by the Lamer Court, and twenty-two by the McLachlin Court. Seventy-six 
of these, or just under half, have been swing judgments, which means that 
plurality judgments make up about 30 per cent of all swing judgments. One 
time in four, then, a set of minority reasons reduces the initial majority 
decision to a minority opinion; however, one time in three that swing stops short 
of turning the initial minority into a majority, and this accounts for half of all 
pluralities. Th e overlap between the two phenomena is not complete, but it does 
encompass a very large proportion of both. Th is fi nding is particularly true of 
the McLachlin Court, where all but fi ve of the twenty-two plurality decisions 
have been swing judgments.
To be sure, this overlap is correlative rather than causative. Clearly, plurality 
decisions (and even more so plurality “no judgment” cases) refl ect a Court that is 
divided to the point of being unable to generate the majority reasons that would 
usefully guide the lower courts, and it is safe to assume that the Court makes 
a genuine eff ort to avoid this whenever possible. Similarly, swing judgments 
refl ect a situation in which there is a degree of fl uidity within a divided panel. In 
those cases where swing judgments do involve plurality decisions, it might well 
be that all that the swing has done is change which less-than-a-majority group 
on the Court (sort of ) prevails. Indeed, rather than suggesting that one of these 
two phenomena causes the other, it might be better to think of swing 
and plurality judgments as overlapping subsets of the broader category of cases 
in which the Supreme Court is expressing an unusual degree of uncertainty and 
division. What is important for present purposes is that it appears that the two 
overlap to the extent that it is not useful to discuss or consider one without 
considering the other as well.
(2000) 4 Wash UJL & Pol’y 261; James F Spriggs II & David R Stras, “Explaining Plurality 
Decisions” (2011) 99:2 Geo LJ 515.
70. See e.g. Th omson Newspapers Ltd v Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive 
Trade Practice Commission), [1990] 1 SCR 425, [1990] SCJ no 23 (QL). Here, a fi ve-judge 
panel split fi ve ways (including three judges who “dissented in part” on diff erent parts of the 
decision), and which nonetheless is one of the leading cases on the issue of corporate self-
incrimination in the context of the Charter.
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VIII. CLOSING THE WINDOW: NEW PATTERNS OF   
DECISION DELIVERY
I have said that in recent decades the SCC has developed a new, distinctive, 
and persisting style for the presentation of its decisions and reasons. Th e Court’s 
judgments follow a standard format, including a number of regular elements 
with generic labels. If there are minority judgments, the authors identify them 
as such (“I have read the reasons”), show institutional deference (“with respect”), 
and self-locate through reference to a specifi c element of the majority analysis 
with which they cannot agree. Th e net result is an unusually coherent package, 
wherein even minority reasons are part of an institutional product that can be 
easily penetrated to identify areas of agreement and disagreement alike. Th is is 
enhanced by the recent Supreme Court Reports practice, beginning in 2005, of 
placing the judgment fi rst, concurrences second, and dissents at the end.
Because of this persisting style, it has been possible for me to identify two 
diff erent types of unusual decision. Th e fi rst category, which is the easiest to 
decipher, is composed of decisions where the minority reasons are presented in 
the full-format style and where the judgment of the Court displays the self-
identifi cation, institutional deference, and self-location typical of minority 
reasons. I have suggested that this unusual pattern is caused by a defection of 
panel members from the initial majority reasons, assigned after the post-hearing 
conference, to reasons that were initially drafted as minority reasons. Th e second 
type occurs when a decision includes two diff erent sets of reasons, one labeled a 
judgment and the other minority reasons, both using the full-format style and 
neither referring to each other or piggy-backing on the more routine parts of 
the standard decision style. I have suggested that this is what happens when the 
“winner” of a swing judgment takes the time to write a new full set of complete 
and free-standing reasons, replacing the minority identifi cation fl ags that are no 
longer appropriate.
I have also suggested that this decision presentation style is perhaps fading or 
being replaced by another. Consider, for example, R v JF.71 Th e judgment of the 
Court is delivered by Justice Fish, who writes fairly briefl y (four thousand words, 
about half the length of the average majority reasons for reserved judgments) to 
resolve an appeal involving allegedly inconsistent verdicts. Justice Deschamps 
writes a solo dissent that clearly does not signal or suggest a swing judgment (her 
71. 2008 SCC 60, [2008] 3 SCR 215.
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fi rst paragraph ends: “I have read the reasons of my colleague Fish J. and, with 
respect, I cannot agree with his approach, which broadens the rule and creates 
a new but illdefi ned notion of inconsistent verdicts.”72), but which is more than 
ten thousand words long and is written in what I have described above as a full 
format. Th is very much looks like a swing judgment, except it clearly isn’t.73 
One case, of course, proves nothing, but in fact it has considerable company: R 
v DB;74 AC v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services);75 Alberta v 
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony;76 Consolidated Fastfrate Inc v Western Canada 
Council of Teamsters;77 Tercon Contracts Ltd v British Columbia (Transportation 
and Highways),78 to provide only the beginning of a longer list. Finding this 
many exceptions to the rule suggests that there may be a new rule.
Th ere is nothing surprising about this evolution. For one thing, the personnel 
of the Court are constantly changing. Chief Justice McLachlin was already the 
only member of the Court who could remember the transition from the Dickson 
to the Lamer Court, at the time when I have suggested the new decision delivery 
style emerged. With the departure of Justice Binnie, she now becomes the only 
member of the present Court to have served under Chief Justice Lamer. But 
more importantly, as argued by Todd Henderson,79 we should remember that 
changes in style and format typically accompany changes in the context or the 
purposes of the Court; in the immediate case, I would suggest that the Court has 
in some sense entered the “post-Charter” era, when exploring the new frontiers 
of the Charter’s implications and applications is no longer the major item on the 
judicial agenda. As a result, a format by which minority reasons fi t themselves 
transparently into a complete conversational package so as to enhance evolving 
meaning is perhaps less attractive as a result, and a “judgment over here, minority 
over there” format of greater and more explicit separation may be more useful as a 
signal of greater constancy and more constrained change. Readers can substitute 
72. Ibid at para 43.
73. It is, of course, possible that this really is a swing judgment, but that Justice Fish has 
rewritten his “once-minority-now-majority” reasons to do away with the self-identifying and 
self-locating markers. It is also possible that Justice Deschamps has edited her “once-majority-
but-now-minority” reasons to directly acknowledge her disagreement with the judgment of 
the Court delivered by Fish. However, this is now piling assumption on top of assumption in 
an increasingly rickety structure, and it seems preferable to take the judges at face value.
74. 2008 SCC 25, [2008] 2 SCR 3.
75. 2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 SCR 181.
76. 2009 SCC 37, [2009] SCR 567.
77. 2009 SCC 53, [2009] 3 SCR 407.
78. 2010 SCC 4, [2010] 1 SCR 69.
79. Henderson, supra note 15.
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their own characterizations of the two stages and their implicit functions for the 
one above; my point is to indicate a changing presentation format that transcends 
personal or idiosyncratic anomalies. 
Whatever the explanation, this change deprives me of the clear markers that 
allowed for the identifi cation of 255 swing judgments that appeared in the 
Supreme Court Reports between 1984 and 2011. Th e SCC is more careful than 
some courts about preventing any details of its internal deliberations to leak out 
into public view. Th e decision format of the last twenty-fi ve years presented a 
window through which one could peek at part of a signifi cant phenomenon 
within those deliberations, namely the movement of judges between positions 
initially sketched out at the post-hearing conference (though only in part, as it 
showed itself only when the result was to swing the judgment of the Court away 
from the initial assignee). If the standard decision format is indeed evolving again, 
this eff ectively closes the window such that this aspect of the Court’s operations 
has once again become opaque. Th e members of the Court may well be pleased 
with this implication.
IX. CONCLUSION: WHY DO SWING JUDGMENTS MATTER?
I have demonstrated that swing judgments happen fairly often on the Supreme 
Court, but this leaves the obvious question: Why does it matter? What diff erence 
does it make to the way that we think about or study the Court, if several times 
every year the justice assigned the judgment loses the majority and winds up 
writing minority reasons?
First, the phenomenon of the swing judgment casts an interesting light on 
what otherwise seems to be a routinely straightforward part of the Court’s 
procedures, namely the circulation and revision of reasons after oral argument. 
If, as I have suggested, more than one reserved judgment in every eight (including 
more than one non-unanimous reserved judgment in every four) involves movement 
within the panel such that the initially assigned writer of the decision loses the 
majority, then this is far from routine. Th is fi nding also suggests (although it 
does not prove) that there is even more movement that is not detected by 
my methodology, which is to say that it simply increases or reduces the size 
of a majority. Th is too is not trivial; a 9-0 or an 8-1 decision carries rather more 
weight and fi nality (other things being equal) than a narrow 5-4 result, and where 
a case fi nally winds up on this continuum is the product not only of the initial 
conference but also of the circulate-and-revise persuasion process. 
Second, the phenomenon of swing judgments casts some doubt on the 
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appropriateness of the attitudinal approach to the study of judicial decision making 
at the level of supreme courts.80 Crudely, the attitudinal approach suggests that 
judges come to cases with a unique set of persisting attitudes and values that 
predispose them to favour certain causes, interests, or parties in certain kinds 
of legal situations. But if judges shift their position as often as I am suggesting, 
then their decision processes are rather more complex and nuanced—in other 
words, if they have changed from their initial position at conference, then one of 
those times (at conference or at the fi nal signature) they must have been acting 
contrary to what the attitudinal approach would have suggested for them. At the 
same time, the fact that these justices have taken two diff erent positions on the 
same issues at two diff erent times undermines the position-counting exercise that 
purportedly allows us to discern the attitudes in the fi rst place. Persuasion clearly 
matters as well as predisposition.
Th ird, it reinforces the idea that panel appeal courts are primarily and 
fundamentally deliberative, refl ective, collegial institutions—what we always 
wanted to think appeal courts were like, until the legal realists arrived. At conference, 
judges do not just hold a straw vote, assign the writing, and then get on with more 
important things—the assignment of writing responsibility is better understood as 
the beginning of a process, generating a package of reasons that is very much 
an institutional product. If the movement of signatures is pronounced enough 
to create the high proportions of swing decisions detected by my methodology, 
then there must be even more unseen movement that swells or shrinks the size of 
the majority of the panel even when it is not suffi  cient to generate a swing; and 
it is entirely reasonable to assume that some non-trivial proportion of the Court’s 
unanimous decisions became so through the circulation of reasons. Swing 
decisions are arguably the “magic moments” for observing the Court because 
they catch the judges in their most visibly refl ective moments, in the act of 
responding to persuasion rather than just digging in. Th e Court shows itself to 
be a refl ective institution that thrives on persuasion and debate; what it is giving 
us in the end is genuine reason rather than post-hoc rationalization.
Fourth, it helps to explain why judges write minority decisions—they do so 
because about one-sixth of the time they are able to persuade enough judges away 
from the majority position such that the minority writer delivers the judgment of the 
Court; to look at it from the other side, one-quarter of the time the original judgment 
writer on a divided panel loses enough signatures such that theirs become minority 
reasons. Th is explanation also suggests that the writers of majority reasons have 
80. Macfarlane makes the same point about vote-switching undermining the assumptions of the 
attitudinal approach. MacFarlane, supra note 9 at 203.
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a positive incentive to pay attention to minority reasons as they circulate and 
to make some real attempt to accommodate their concerns at least in part. Th e 
judicial discussion at the conference that follows oral argument is therefore not 
sons constituting a routine follow-up. Instead, when the conference reveals some 
real diff erence of position between the judges, it can become just the fi rst act of a 
more extended play, the ending of which is by no means foreordained.
Fifth, it suggests the usefulness of looking at historical “might-have-beens” 
—what would the law look like if the initial majority-at-conference had not been 
eroded so as to become a minority (in specifi c cases or, even more signifi cantly, 
in specifi c areas of law). One example, introduced but not developed by my 
initial reference to the labour trilogy, might be the evolution (or, as labour union 
sympathizers might prefer, lack of evolution) of labour rights under the Charter 
in the context of freedom of association. Closer study may fi nd others. Such an 
approach is useful to overcome the sense of inevitability that the Court likes to 
aff ect in order to reinforce its decisions and that tends to emerge in discussions of 
jurisprudential trends. Persuasion implies contingency; contingency implies the 
potential for alternatives.
Sixth, it helps to explain the problem of plurality judgments—that is, the 
instances when the Court fails to provide an explanation, in the form of outcome 
plus reasons, that is fully supported by at least a bare majority of the panel. Th is 
has occurred an average of six times a year since 1984, so it is not a marginal question but 
rather an ongoing issue. Further, half of all plurality judgments are the products 
of swings that took the majority away from the initial writer, these accounting 
for a third of all of the swing judgments. Th e two phenomena—swing judgments 
and plurality outcomes—are clearly linked, (presumably by sharing an underlying 
cause, and not in the sense that one causes the other), and understanding the one 
helps to explain the other.
Seventh, like the overlapping but non-identical category of plurality judgments, 
swing decisions represent something that is more tentative than other decisions 
with comparable voting fragments on the panel. Th e fact that some members of 
the panel started with a diff erent point of view but were persuaded over time to 
adopt another suggests a residual attractiveness to that initial position that the 
subtly diff erent issues, facts, and arguments of a subsequent case might trigger. 
Th is observation seems all the more credible where the choice is between adhering 
to a long-standing precedent and striking out in a new direction. It is always a 
disappointment for a litigant to lose an important case—at one level, it might be 
all the more frustrating to discover that at conference you were actually winning, 
only to have this support erode—but surely this is simultaneously an invitation 
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to try regain some ground in a later case by exploiting that softness. If your cause 
has lost by way of a swing judgment, then this is encouraging: Th e votes and the 
signatures were almost there, and if you fi nd a more appealing fact situation, a 
stronger legal argument, or a better social context in which to present the matter 
(or all three), then that “there just for a moment” voting coalition might very 
well re-emerge and hold together. Conversely, if your cause almost lost, but only 
seized victory from the jaws of defeat at the last moment in a swing judgment, 
you are on notice that your gains are tentative rather than permanent, such that 
they may be nibbled away or even lost altogether in the future.
Eighth, by combining these fi ndings with the observations of Songer and 
others, the swing judgment phenomenon may reveal another way in which 
female judges can be incorporated into full participation at this highest level 
of the judicial profession. Songer has suggested that women judges are 
disadvantaged in the assignment of reasons for judgment; my fi ndings suggest 
that they are disadvantaged overall by the swing judgment phenomenon. Playing 
on George Orwell’s famous slogan in his extended parable Animal Farm: All 
Supreme Court justices are equal, but perhaps some are more equal than others.
In all of these ways, swing judgments cast the decision making of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in a diff erent, and hopefully more useful and interesting, 
light while simultaneously rendering the decision of judges to write separately 
more understandable. Reason and persuasion, not the simple force majeure of a 
few more votes, pervades the jurisprudence of the Court, and this fact means that 
the boundary between winning and losing, between writing majority judgments 
and writing minority reasons, is thinner and more porous than it might appear. 
Sometimes, Supreme Court judges change their minds; we should pay attention 
to the signals they send us at those important moments. 
